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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of the study is twofold; firstly, to use data envelopment analysis (DEA) to estimate the 
technical efficiencies of Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE)-listed companies (per industry) to 
convert the multiple components of CEO remuneration into multiple company determinants, 
namely size and performance indicators, and secondly, to develop an efficiency frontier to serve 
as a benchmark to suggest acceptable CEO remuneration levels. An empirical study was executed 
on a sample of 221 JSE-listed companies. Cross-sectional data of CEO remuneration and 
company determinants were obtained from the McGregor BFA database for the 2010 financial 
year. The study found that CEOs from 80 of the 221 companies included in the sample emerged as 
the benchmark CEOs and formed the efficiency frontier against which inefficient CEOs were 
compared. The practical value is that remuneration committees can use this model, which is based 
on best practices, to simplify the structuring of reasonable CEO remuneration packages. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
xcessive remuneration packages of CEOs in South Africa recently became widely publicized and 
subjected to public scrutiny (Finweek, 2012; Ensor, 2010; Financial Mail, 2008) with the concern is 
that CEOs are remunerating themselves at the expense of shareholders’ interests and the long-term 
success of the company (BPP Learning Media, 2010). Furthermore, the gap between CEO salaries and the average 
wage of an ordinary worker is continuously increasing (Sapa, 2011). This study is an attempt to develop and validate 
benchmarks for CEO remuneration of companies listed on the different industries of the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSE). A data envelopment analysis (DEA) model is developed to generate expected remuneration values 
that are compared with actual remuneration. The practical value of this study is the setting of new parameters for 
CEO remuneration in South Africa. The importance thereof is that the results can assist company boards of directors 
in making informed business decisions in this regard. 
 
In South Africa, research has been conducted by a number of institutes and individuals. For example, 
Adcorps’ new quarterly Labour Market Navigator analyzed JSE-listed companies and made public the results 
regarding the over- or underpaying of CEOs (Finweek, 2012). Other South African researchers are Bradley (2011), 
Dommisse (2011), Theunissen (2010) and Krugel and Kruger (2006), but a limitation of these researchers’ studies is 
that no benchmarking model, based on best practices, was suggested to determine acceptable levels of CEO 
remuneration. All the above-mentioned studies analyzed CEO remuneration by means of a two-dimensional 
statistical model, namely the linear regression analysis, which is based on averages and fails to indicate an 
appropriate level of inputs or outputs that will represent an optimal solution (Thanassoulis, 1993). 
 
A recent article in Business Report announced that Bobby Godsell, chairman of Business Leadership SA, 
has called for a commission on high pay to be established in South Africa, similar to the UK’s High Pay 
Commission (Crotty, 2012). Also in this regard, Gerald Seegers, South African partner of PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
is of the opinion that new executive reward models are required that can be tailored to specific businesses that are 
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both relevant and simple in terms of design and number of elements. He continued that existing executive pay 
models have largely failed in two aspects: i) serving as a motivational tool, and ii) establishing goal congruence 
between executives and shareholders (PwC, 2010). What is needed is a business-specific, multi-element model to 
benchmark CEO remuneration and therefore a simple two-dimensional model will not suffice. CEO remuneration, 
consisting of multiple components (a basic salary, short- and long-term incentives), has to be benchmarked within 
the context of the different factors, e.g. company size and performance (Cordeiro et al., 2006), on which the basic 
salary and additional incentives are based. An acceptable benchmarking model is therefore needed to firstly 
determine whether a particular CEO is being over- or underpaid within the context of business specific elements and 
secondly, the model should be able to indicate an acceptable level of remuneration. The DEA may provide a 
potential benchmarking model. It is a linear programming technique that allows relative efficiency to be defined in 
terms of multiple inputs and outputs (Paradi et al., 2010). Only four previous studies could be identified that 
combine the DEA with CEO remuneration. The first two studies, by Mohan and Ruggiero (2003) and Bowlin and 
Renner (2008), used DEA to study gender equity in top-management-team compensation. The following two 
studies, which are most relevant to the current study, are by Cordeiro et al. (2006), which pointed out the 
shortcomings of traditional parametric approaches, such as regression analysis, when analyzing CEO remuneration 
practices by using an input-orientated approach. Total (aggregated) CEO Remuneration was the only input to their 
model and various measures of company size and performance were used as the outputs. The other study, by 
Oberholzer and Theunissen (2012), investigated 187 JSE companies and compared CEO remuneration where 
benchmarks were determined by an input-orientated DEA model (where total (aggregated) remuneration was the 
only input variable), versus a linear regression analysis model. To summarize, the gap in the literature is that no 
research has been conducted where the multiple CEO remuneration components were disaggregated, where both an 
input- and output-orientation approach were used and the benchmarks, based on best practices, were set for the 
different industries. 
 
The purpose of the study is twofold; firstly, to estimate input- and output-orientated technical efficiencies 
of all JSE-listed companies (per industry) to convert the multiple components of CEO remuneration into a number 
of company determinants, and secondly, to develop an efficiency frontier to serve as a benchmark to suggest 
acceptable CEO remuneration levels based on a company’s performance indicators as defined in the DEA model. To 
fulfill the purpose, an empirical study was executed on a sample of 221 JSE-listed companies to estimate the above-
mentioned technical efficiencies and to develop an efficiency frontier (best practice frontier) to serve as a 
benchmark for CEO remuneration in the different industries. Cross-sectional data of CEO remuneration and 
company determinants were obtained from the McGregor BFA (2012) database for the 2010 financial year. The 
central argument is that DEA is the most suitable model that can set separate benchmarks for multiple CEO 
remuneration components (inputs) and benchmarks for multiple company determinants (outputs). 
 
The contribution of this study is twofold: From a research perspective, it contributes to the advancement of 
CEO remuneration research by introducing an alternative, multi-dimensional model by which CEO remuneration 
can be analyzed; and from a practitioner’s perspective, boards of directors can justify the level of remuneration paid 
to CEOs in terms of the company’s size and performance by applying the DEA. This model also provides a 
benchmark for CEO remuneration in terms of the inputs and outputs defined. The DEA could be used as a guide to 
determine acceptable remuneration levels that may decrease the gap between CEO remuneration and that of the 
average worker. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section provides a background to the study, 
followed by a section that explains the theory, i.e. the business factors and the DEA model, and a section that 
explains the research methodology. This is followed by a section that reveals the results and the study is concluded 
in the final section. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
CEO remuneration is excessively high and could be linked to several factors that contributed to these pay 
hikes. Three of these factors are briefly discussed below. Firstly, recent investigations revealed that CEOs made 
millions when they exercised their share options. The size of the gain mainly depends on the number of share 
options and the prevailing share price on the date the option is exercised. To a certain extent, a CEO can influence 
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the share price through good governance, but there are also uncontrollable market factors that can influence the 
share price. This fuels the argument that CEOs reap the benefits of an increased share price, while the increase was 
due to market factors and not so much to their own contribution (Financial Mail, 2008). 
 
A second contributing factor to the pay hikes is the discrepancy between pay and performance. Former 
South African finance minister, Trevor Manuel, reported that government is concerned as ever about pay levels, 
especially where there is no relation to the performance of the company (Financial Mail, 2008). The current South 
African finance minister, Pravin Gordhan, shares this view by saying that extreme earning disparities cause offence 
not just when they are associated with profiteering or financial malfeasance, but also when the reward for honest 
work seems disproportionate or weakly aligned with incentives (Ensor, 2010). 
 
A third possible cause of pay hikes, examined by Hayes and Schaefer (2007), is known as the ‘Lake 
Wobegon Effect’. Gareth Keillor, radio host and humorist, refers to a fictional hometown, Lake Wobegon, where 
every child is above average. This also seems to be the case with CEOs, where companies are prepared to pay ever-
increasing salaries to convince shareholders that their CEO is above average, because this makes the company look 
strong. Most boards want their CEO to be in the top half of the CEO peer group. Therefore, when another CEO 
obtains a raise, their CEO gets one too, even if s/he had a bad year (Hayes & Schaefer, 2007). 
 
To complicate things, CEO remuneration consists of multiple components (inputs), and on the other hand, 
the CEO should be remunerated for multiple company determinants (outputs), such as company size and 
performance. Therefore, the conceptual scope of the study is that a model that can accommodate multiple inputs and 
outputs should be used to set a separate benchmark for each variable, i.e. from an input-orientated view, a 
benchmark can be set for each remuneration component and, from an output-orientated view, a benchmark can be 
set regarding each company determinant. 
 
THEORY 
 
This section focuses on three aspects, namely the components of CEO remuneration, the determinants for 
CEO remuneration and an in-depth explanation of DEA. Remuneration practices vary substantially across 
companies and industries, but mostly CEO remuneration will contain the following components: Salary, benefits 
and pension, annual bonus, share options and long-term incentive plans (Yanadori et al., 2002; Frydman & Jenter, 
2010). 
 
Two determinants of CEO remuneration are included in the study, namely company performance and 
company size. According to Murphy (1999), CEO wealth is explicitly tied to the shareholder’s objective (creation of 
shareholder wealth) through his/her holdings of share, restricted share, and share options. In addition, CEO wealth is 
implicitly tied to share-price performance through accounting-based bonuses (reflecting the correlation between 
accounting returns and share price performance) and through year-to-year adjustments in salary levels, target 
bonuses, and option and restricted share grant sizes. Therefore, payouts should be positively related to the 
shareholder’s objective (increasing shareholder wealth) and to other measures, like accounting measures of firm 
performance, that provide imperfect incentives to the CEO to take actions generally consistent with value 
maximization. 
 
The effect of an increase in company size on CEO remuneration is frequently investigated in CEO 
remuneration research. Devers et al. (2007) report that a meta-analysis in the area of CEO remuneration research 
demonstrated that company size accounted for over 40% of the variance in total CEO remuneration. Researchers 
make several suggestions as to why larger companies might have higher CEO remuneration levels: Larger firms 
may employ better-qualified and better-paid managers (Murphy, 1999), have more operations, subsidiaries and 
layers of management (Lippert & Moore, 1994), require a higher level of responsibility and have more complex 
tasks and therefore place greater value on decision-making (Janssen, 2009). 
 
Data Envelopment Analysis 
 
The concept of establishing a satisfactory measure for productive efficiency that takes account of all inputs 
was first introduced by Farrell (1957). The DEA model was later developed and formalized by Charnes et al. (1978) 
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in response to the challenge laid down by Farrell, which was to estimate the production function either through a 
parametric approach or by using non-parametric linear technology (Avkiran & Rowlands, 2008). The most 
comprehensive definition of the DEA is that it is a non-parametric linear programming technique that computes a 
comparative ratio of outputs to inputs for each unit, which is reported as the relative efficiency score (Avkiran, 
1999). (Unit refers to a decision-making unit, i.e. company with regard to this study). It creates a frontier of the best 
performing units within the dataset (Bowlin & Renner, 2008), which consists of units that possess some common 
functional traits, but whose efficiency may vary due to internal differences (El-Mahgary & Lahdelma, 1995). Its 
main usefulness lies in its ability to identify units to benchmark against and to generate potential improvements for 
inefficient units (Avkiran, 1999). 
 
The DEA allows the analyst to select multiple inputs and outputs in accordance with a managerial focus 
and it can work with variables of different units without the need for standardization (i.e. monetary value, 
percentage, number of employees, etc.). This process involves identifying performance variables (outputs) that 
reflect the corporate objectives and strategies of the company and then determining the input variables that can be 
demonstrated to manifest themselves as outputs (Avkiran, 1999). This characteristic is especially useful in this study 
where there are multiple CEO remuneration components (inputs) and determinants (outputs) to consider. 
Furthermore, there are no multi-co linearity problems with the DEA like there are with regression analysis, so 
variables that measure similar CEO or company characteristics (determinants) can be used simultaneously in the 
model (Bowlin & Renner, 2008). Another common practice in DEA is to allow the optimization programme to 
determine the weights for each variable included in the model. However, it is possible to restrict the weight of 
variables if management is concerned that a variable might be under- or over-represented (Avkiran, 1999). 
 
The analyst also has the model options of input minimization and output maximization with the DEA. Input 
minimization (input-orientated approach) examines the extent to which inputs can be reduced while maintaining 
output levels. Potential improvements indicated by the DEA may suggest increasing outputs and lowering inputs at 
the same time if output slacks depict under-produced outputs. Alternatively, output maximization (output-orientated 
approach) investigates the extent to which outputs can be raised given current input levels. 
 
The efficiency frontier, or envelope, is the foundation for the whole concept of DEA. The DEA identifies 
inefficiency in a particular unit by comparing it to similar units regarded as efficient (Avkiran, 1999). If a given 
producer, A, is capable of producing YA units of output with XA inputs, then other producers should also be able to 
do the same if they were to operate efficiently. Similarly, if producer B is capable of producing YB units of output 
with XB inputs, then other producers should also be capable of the same production schedule (Anderson, 1996). 
Producers A and B can be combined to form a hypothetical unit that is constructed as a weighted average of the two 
observed units (reference set). Anderson (1996) states that the heart of the DEA lies in finding the ‘best’ virtual unit 
for each real unit. If the virtual unit is better than the original unit by generating more output with the same input or 
generating the same output with less input, the original unit is inefficient. This way the DEA can also be used to 
benchmark the best practice in a particular group of units (Avkiran, 1999). If the analyst knows which efficient units 
are most comparable to the inefficient unit, they will develop a better understanding of the nature of the 
inefficiencies and can re-allocate scarce resources in order to improve productivity (Avkiran, 1999). 
 
Another feature of the DEA, for which the analyst should make some assumptions, regards the nature of 
returns to scale that best reflect the operations of the units in the sample. The two types of returns to scale to 
consider are constant returns to scale (CRS) or variable returns to scale (VRS). CRS implies a proportionate rise in 
outputs when inputs are increased. In this case, the scale of operations does not influence the efficiency of the unit. 
VRS implies a disproportionate rise or fall in outputs when inputs are increased. This means that as a unit grows in 
size, its efficiency would either rise or fall (Avkiran, 1999). 
 
The most important limitation of the DEA is that it assumes data to be free of measurement error. If the 
integrity of data has been violated, DEA results cannot be interpreted with confidence because the efficiency scores 
of units both on and under the frontier will be biased. A second limitation of the DEA is that those units indicated as 
efficient are only efficient in relation to others inside the sample (Avkiran, 1999). Thirdly, the DEA is a good 
indicator of relative efficiency, but not absolute efficiency. In other words, it indicates how well a unit is doing 
compared to its peers, but not compared to a theoretical maximum (Anderson, 1996). Furthermore, the DEA will not 
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discriminate well if the ratio of units to the product of inputs and outputs is low, because most units would simply 
appear as efficient and lie on the frontier (Avkiran, 1999). To summarize, DEA is a useful tool in setting targets for 
inefficient units to improve performance, but the drawback is that it does not indicate to the analyst how to reach 
those targets or why the unit is not performing well. The reference set is a good starting point, but further analysis is 
necessary to identify specific problems within a unit. 
 
METHOD 
 
In this study, CEO remuneration components will be the inputs and business determinants will be the 
outputs of the DEA model. The input-orientated approach will be used to indicate by how much CEO remuneration 
can be reduced while maintaining a certain level of company performance and size. The output-orientated approach 
will also be used to indicate what level of company performance or size justifies the current CEO remuneration 
level. 
 
Variable Description 
 
In Table 1, the inputs to the DEA model represent the components of CEO remuneration (X1, X2, X3, X4), 
which are in accordance with the terms and classification used in the McGregor BFA (2012). This multiple 
classification allows for more accurate benchmarking because it makes it possible to pinpoint which component has 
to be increased or reduced to improve the efficiency score of a CEO rather than just suggesting an increase or 
reduction of total CEO remuneration. 
 
Table 1: Input and Output Measures 
 Symbol Concept Measure 
Inputs: Remuneration 
Components 
X1 Base Pay ‘Salary’ 
X2 
Perquisites and Pension Total of ‘Retirement and/or Medical’ 
contributions, ‘Allowances and Benefits’, ‘Motor 
and Travel’ allowances and ‘Fee/Levy Payment’ 
X3 
Annual Bonus Plans Total of ‘Bonus paid in current year’, 
‘Performance Bonus’, ‘Other Benefits’ and “Once 
off Payments’ 
X4 Long-term Incentives ‘Gains on Shares’ 
Outputs: Determinants Y1 Company Performance Return on Equity 
Y2 
Company Size Total Assets 
(Including intangible assets) 
Source: Classification used in the McGregor BFA database  
 
Also in Table 1 are the outputs to the DEA model, which represent the determinants of CEO remuneration 
(Y1, Y2). ‘Company Performance’ is measured in terms of Return on Equity (ROE). ROE can be disaggregated 
using the DuPont Analysis, where this disaggregation facilitates the examination of ROE in terms of a measure for 
profitability (Net Income ÷ Sales), level of assets required to generate sales (Sales ÷ Total Assets) and the financing 
of those assets (Total Assets ÷ Equity) (Feroz et al., 2003). ROE is therefore a suitable measure for company 
performance because it encompasses three dimensions (profit margins, asset utilization and financing) that are all 
affected by the CEO’s actions and decisions. Following Oberholzer and Theunissen (2012), Theunissen (2010), 
Bowlin and Renner (2008), Chen et al. (2008), Total Assets was chosen as a measure for ‘Company Size’ as shown 
in Table 1, because it represents managerial concern with company growth and size. The value of Total Assets used 
in this study includes intangible assets to account for the size of companies that own non-monetary assets without 
physical substance such as intellectual or human capital. 
 
Sample Statistics 
 
The McGregor BFA (2012) database was used to gather financial and CEO remuneration data for JSE-
listed companies with financial year ends during 2010. The initial dataset consisted of 359 companies, but 
companies that did not provide CEO remuneration data were eliminated because the data could not be manually 
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retrieved from the annual reports in the same format as the McGregor BFA (2012). Furthermore, since the software 
of Zhu (2004) used in this analysis only accepts positive data, companies with negative financial data were also 
eliminated. After elimination of the above-mentioned companies, the final sample consists of 221 companies across 
nine different industries. Following Cordeiro et al. (2006), each industry will be analyzed separately with the DEA 
to account for the variation across industries. Table 2 summarizes the number of companies in the sample and 
different industries: 
 
Table 2: Sample Statistics 
Sample n Industry n 
Companies 221 Basic Materials 41 
CEOs 221 Consumer Goods 20 
Industries 9 Consumer Services 33 
  
Financials 48 
Health Care 5 
  Industrials 57 
  Oil & Gas 1 
  Technology 11 
  Telecommunications 5 
  Total 221 
Source: McGregor BFA 
 
In order to discriminate well between the efficient and inefficient CEOs, the sample size has to be at least 
three times larger than the sum of the number of inputs and outputs (Avkiran, 1999). Therefore, a sample size of at 
least 18 companies in each industry ((4 inputs + 2 outputs = 6) x 3 = 18) is required to analyze it separately. Table 2 
indicates that the Healthcare, Oil and Gas, and Technology and Telecommunications industries have fewer than 18 
companies and can therefore not be analyzed separately. In order to include these companies in the analysis, these 
industries were joined with industries of a similar kind to obtain a sample of 18 or more companies. Oil and Gas was 
joined with Basic Materials, while Healthcare, and Technology and Telecommunications were joined together since 
all three of these industries involve some form of technology, technological equipment or technology-related 
services. Since the year-end dates of the companies differ, all the monetary values in the dataset were adjusted with 
the Producer Price Index (PPI) factor. December 2010 was chosen as the base month and every other month of 2010 
was expressed as a factor of the base month. Companies trading on the JSE in a foreign currency were included in 
the sample by converting the monetary values to Rand (South African currency), using the appropriate exchange rate 
on the financial year-end date for each company. Table 3 and Table 4 show the descriptive statistics for the 
remuneration components (inputs) and the remuneration determinants (outputs), respectively. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for CEO Remuneration Components 
Remuneration Components Salary 
(R) 
Perquisites and 
Pension 
(R) 
Annual Bonus 
Plans 
(R) 
Gains  
On Shares 
(R) 
Mean (Average) 3,503,827 633,207 3,098,542 3,466,495 
Median 2,650,000 356,563 1,663,000 0 
Standard Deviation 3,870,023 1,292,309 4,595,824 39,314,269 
Minimum 567,820 0 0 0 
Maximum 44,100,687 14,734,000 27,879,360 583,020,833 
Source: Own calculations based on data from McGregor BFA 
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Remuneration Determinants 
Remuneration Determinants 
Return  
On Equity 
Total Assets (Incl. Intangible Assets) 
(R’000) 
Mean (Average) 19.61% 41,863,062 
Median 14.07% 3,817,608 
Standard Deviation 32.50% 145,473,062 
Minimum 0.00% 48,677 
Maximum 430.18% 1,336,308,000 
Source: Own calculations based on data from McGregor BFA 
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Model Formulation 
 
This study is based on the DEA model presented by Zhu (2004) for both the input-orientated and output-
orientated approaches. These models are based on VRS, which takes account of different CEO remuneration policies 
across the different companies under review. A set of n observations will be considered on the CEOs. Each 
observation, CEOj (j = 1,...n), uses m inputs xij (i = 1,2,...,m) to produce s outputs yrj (r = 1,2,...,s). The efficiency 
frontier will be determined by these n observations. The mathematical formulations of the input- and output-
orientated approaches are shown in Table 5.       represents one of the   CEOs under review and     and     are 
the  th input and  th output for     , respectively.  
 
Table 5: DEA Models 
Input-Orientated Output-Orientated 
          
 
 
   
    
 
 
   
  
           
   
 
   
        
                      
   
 
   
        
                     
   
 
   
    
                                                
          
 
 
   
    
 
 
   
  
           
   
 
   
        
                    
   
 
   
        
                     
   
 
   
    
                                                
Source: Zhu (2004) 
 
The value of   represents the input-orientated efficiency score and   the output-orientated efficiency score 
of       If     or    ,      lies on the frontier. If     or    ,      is inefficient and should either 
decrease its input levels or increase its output levels. It is possible for the DEA to indicate an individual input 
reduction or output increase for a specific CEO in order to move it onto the frontier. These input reductions or 
output increases are called input or output slacks and are represented by   
  and   
   respectively. The presence of   
in the input-orientated model allows the minimization over   to pre-empt the optimization involving the slacks,   
  
and   
 . The model is therefore calculated in a two-stage process. Firstly, maximal reduction of inputs is achieved by 
optimizing  . Secondly, movement onto the frontier is achieved by optimising the slack variables. Similarly, the 
output-orientated model is also calculated in a two-stage process by firstly calculating   and then optimizing the 
slacks by fixing  . Ray (2004) clarifies slacks with a simple example: Suppose that in a particular application 
        is obtained. This means that all the outputs should be increased by 25% for the company to become fully 
efficient. Now suppose that   
     . This implies that output1 can be further increased by 10 units. Moreover, if 
any one of the input slacks is strictly positive, the previous expansion of the outputs can be achieved while reducing 
individual inputs at the same time. 
 
The left-hand sides of the models shown in Table 5 are called the ‘Reference Set’ and the right-hand side 
represents the specific CEO under evaluation. The non-zero optimal    represents the benchmarks for the specific 
CEO under evaluation. The reference set, as shown in Table 5, provides coefficients (    to form the hypothetical 
efficient CEO. The reference set shows how inputs can be decreased and outputs increased to make the CEO under 
evaluation efficient. 
 
RESULTS 
 
This section presents the results obtained from the DEA. The first and second sub-sections fulfill the first 
purpose of the study and provide an overview per industry of the efficient and inefficient companies as well as the 
distribution of the companies with efficiency scores within a certain range for the input-orientated and output-
orientated approaches, respectively. The third sub-section fulfils the second purpose of the study and presents the 
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results from two of the most useful features of the DEA, namely to indicate the benchmark companies and to 
suggest potential improvements for inefficient companies. 
 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for Efficient and Inefficient CEOs 
 
Salary 
(R) 
Perquisites 
and Pension 
(R) 
Annual 
Bonus Plans 
(R) 
Gains on 
Shares 
(R) 
ROE 
 
Total Assets 
(R’000) 
  
      Average 
      Efficient (n=80) 3,830,728 569,075 2,828,450 901,929 27.63% 58,724,823 
Inefficient (n=141) 3,318,351 669,594 3,251,786 4,921,568 15.06% 32,296,106 
Minimum 
      Efficient  567,820 0 0 0 0.00% 48,677 
Inefficient  829,665 0 0 0 0.75% 86,720 
Maximum 
      Efficient  44,100,687 6,105,861 27,879,360 36,720,160 430.18% 1,336,308,000 
Inefficient  24,860,518 14,734,000 25,957,049 583,020,833 99.64% 828,919,309 
Source: Own calculations based on data from McGregor BFA 
 
After the DEA has been applied to the sample, a distinction could be made between the efficient and 
inefficient CEOs. Table 6 presents the descriptive statistics for these two groups within the sample. In total, 80 of 
the 221 companies included in the sample emerged as the benchmark companies and formed the efficiency frontier 
against which the inefficient companies were compared. Table 6 points out that the average salary paid to CEOs of 
efficient companies (from here on referred to as ‘efficient CEOs’) is higher than the average salary paid to CEOs of 
inefficient companies (‘inefficient CEOs’). It also points out that the amounts of Perquisites and Pension, Annual 
Bonus Plans and Gains on shares for inefficient CEOs exceed those of the efficient CEOs, while company 
performance (ROE) and size (Total Assets) are less than that of efficient CEOs. This explains why these CEOs are 
deemed as inefficient, because their current remuneration levels are not justified by the company’s current 
performance and size. 
 
Input-Orientated Results 
 
The input-orientated efficiency score is expressed as 1.0 (or 100%) for efficient companies and less than 
1.0 (or < 100%) for inefficient companies. Each industry was analyzed separately with the DEA and Table 7 shows 
how the companies in each industry are distributed between the efficient and inefficient groups for the input-
orientated approach. 
 
Table 7: Input-Orientated Efficiency Score Distribution 
Input-Orientated Efficient Inefficient 
 
Minimum 
Efficiency 
Score 
Average 
Efficiency 
Score Industry No. % No. % Total 
Basic Materials, Oil & Gas 14 33% 28 67% 42 0.259 0.709 
Consumer Goods 13 65% 7 35% 20 0.628 0.923 
Consumer Services 8 24% 25 76% 33 0.389 0.757 
Financials 13 27% 35 73% 48 0.134 0.577 
Healthcare, Technology,  
Telecommunications 
12 57% 9 43% 21 0.222 0.730 
Industrials 20 35% 37 65% 57 0.356 0.763 
Total 80 
 
141 
 
221 
  Source: Calculations based on data from McGregor BFA and elaborated using the software of Zhu (2004)  
 
Table 7 shows that the Consumer Goods industry has the highest percentage of efficient companies, 
followed by the Healthcare, Technology and Telecommunications industry, while the Consumer Service industry 
has the lowest percentage of efficient companies. It further shows that the lowest input-orientated efficiency score of 
0.134 falls within the Financials industry and that this industry also has the lowest average input-orientated 
efficiency score of 0.577. This means that, on average, companies within this industry are only 57.7% efficient and 
have to reduce their remuneration packages by at least 42.3% in order to be fully efficient (57.7% + 42.3% = 100%). 
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Output-Orientated Results 
 
The output-orientated efficiency score is also expressed as 1.0 (or 100%) for efficient companies, but more 
than 1.0 (or > 100%) for inefficient companies. Table 8 shows how the companies in each industry are distributed 
between the efficient and inefficient groups for the output-orientated approach. 
 
Table 8: Output-Orientated Efficiency Score Distribution 
Output-Orientated Efficient Inefficient 
 
Maximum 
Efficiency 
Score 
Average 
Efficiency 
Score Industry No. % No. % Total 
Basic Materials, Oil & Gas 14 33% 28 67% 42 15.494 3.796 
Consumer Goods 13 65% 7 35% 20 5.629 1.376 
Consumer Services 8 24% 25 76% 33 19.258 2.406 
Financials 13 27% 35 73% 48 15.066 2.801 
Healthcare, Technology,  
Telecommunications 
12 57% 9 43% 21 6.141 1.793 
Industrials 20 35% 37 65% 57 11.736 1.991 
Total 80 
 
141 
 
221 
  Source: Calculations based on data from McGregor BFA and elaborated using the software of Zhu (2004)  
 
The same number of companies per industry is efficient under the output-orientated approach in Table 8 
compared to the input-orientated approach in Table 7. In Table 8, the highest efficiency score indicates the least 
efficient company. The maximum output-orientated efficiency score of 19.258 exists in the Consumer Services 
industry, which means that the CEO of that company has to increase current company performance and size by more 
than 19 times in order to justify his/her current remuneration. It further points out that the Basic Materials and Oil & 
Gas industries have the highest average output-orientated efficiency score of 3.796, indicating that, on average, these 
CEOs have to increase company performance and size by almost four times in order to be efficient. 
 
Benchmarks and Improvements 
 
The benchmarking power of the DEA lies in its ability to identify efficient companies and to suggest target 
remuneration levels, company performance and size values for the inefficient companies by comparing them to the 
efficiency frontier created by the efficient companies. After applying the DEA, several companies within each 
industry emerged as the benchmark companies for that particular industry. The benchmark companies are those 
companies that obtained an efficiency score of 1.0 under the input-orientated or output-orientated approach. 
 
The DEA compares each of the inefficient companies to the benchmark companies within its industry to 
establish specific targets for both the inputs and outputs that the inefficient company or CEO has to obtain in order 
to be efficient. Under the input-orientated approach, the input reductions required to reach the input targets are also 
an indication of how much overpaid the CEO is. Alternatively, under the output-orientated approach, the output 
increases required to reach the output targets are an indication of how much the CEO is currently underperforming. 
Table 9 summarizes the potential improvements for inefficient CEOs by presenting them as input reductions and 
output increases required per industry: 
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Table 9: Potential Improvements for Inefficient CEOs 
 
Reduction required Increase required 
Salary 
Perquisites  
and Pension 
Annual 
Bonus 
Plans 
Gains on 
Shares ROE 
Total 
Assets 
Basic Materials, Oil & Gas 
      Average -43.6% -45.3% -59.1% -25.0% 35.2% 419.4% 
Min -0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.8% 1.9% 
Max -74.1% -86.8% -92.4% -100.0% 135.4% 1449.4% 
Consumer Goods 
      Average -21.9% -29.1% -21.6% -24.3% 7.9% 146.2% 
Min -2.4% -8.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 35.3% 
Max -37.2% -39.3% -37.2% -88.1% 16.1% 462.9% 
Consumer Services 
      Average -34.1% -49.5% -59.7% -28.0% 17.9% 233.3% 
Min -1.9% -1.9% 0.0% 0.0% 1.4% 7.0% 
Max -86.4% -90.8% -94.6% -100.0% 42.2% 1825.8% 
Financials 
      Average -58.4% -57.4% -67.4% -14.3% 20.8% 410.6% 
Min -24.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.0% 9.4% 
Max -86.6% -98.4% -100.0% -100.0% 42.6% 2450.8% 
Healthcare, Technology, 
Telecommunications 
      Average -62.9% -67.3% -72.7% -22.2% 24.7% 331.7% 
Min -37.5% -42.6% -42.6% 0.0% 10.6% 69.3% 
Max -77.8% -77.8% -91.1% -100.0% 57.2% 837.0% 
Industrials 
      Average -36.5% -47.6% -36.4% -8.1% 11.5% 152.7% 
Min -0.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.5% 5.8% 
Max -64.4% -96.3% -82.1% -100.0% 33.3% 1073.6% 
Source: Calculations based on data from McGregor BFA and elaborated using the software of Zhu (2004)  
 
The information contained in Table 9 should serve as a guideline to boards of directors when the CEO 
remuneration package is structured. It shows by how much CEOs are currently overpaid and by how much their 
remuneration should be reduced in order to be in line with the benchmark companies. The lowest minimum 
reduction required for salary is 0.3 per cent, which means that all of the inefficient CEOs are overpaid to some 
extent in terms of their basic salary. Furthermore, it shows that Perquisites and Pension, Annual Bonus plans and 
Gains on Shares indicate minimum reductions of 0 per cent, which means that the current amounts paid in terms of 
these remuneration components to some CEOs are acceptable. However, the DEA returned interesting results for the 
Gains on Shares component of remuneration. Only a few CEOs received payment in the form of Gains on Shares, 
but unless these were CEOs of efficient companies, the DEA suggested a 100 per cent reduction in Gains on Shares 
(with the exception of two cases within the Consumer Goods industry), meaning that the target amount of Gains on 
Shares for all inefficient companies is zero. This finding supports public belief (Financial Mail, 2008) that long-term 
incentive schemes, such as share options, enable CEOs to earn excessive remuneration despite poor company 
performance and the DEA suggests that CEOs should not be paid any amount in terms of this component. 
 
In Table 9, the output-orientated approach suggests considerable increases in ROE and Total Assets, which 
means that most of the inefficient CEOs are earning the same as CEOs in much bigger and better performing 
companies, while their company’s current size and performance do not permit him/her being remunerated at such a 
high level. The output-orientated information is also valuable to boards of directors in showing what the ROE and 
Total Assets values should be if they were to continue remunerating their CEO at the current level. Table 9 indicates 
that ROE has to be increased with as little as 0.5 per cent to a maximum of 135.4 per cent and Total Assets by a 
minimum of 1.9 per cent to a maximum of 2450.8 per cent. It is questionable how inefficient companies manage to 
afford such excessive remuneration packages when that money could have been utilized elsewhere to improve the 
performance or size of the company. 
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A detailed breakdown per company of the specific reductions required for each remuneration component or 
increase required in company performance and size is shown in Appendix 1. As a result of space restriction, only the 
Consumer Goods Industry is shown. The table shows both the input-orientated and output-orientated efficiency 
scores in descending order together with the input reductions and output increases for the companies in this industry. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
A summary of the results indicates the following: 
 
 Efficient CEOs earn a higher average salary than inefficient CEOs; 
 Inefficient CEOs earn higher amounts of Perquisites and Pension, Annual Bonus Plans and Gains on Shares 
than efficient CEOs, while their company performance (ROE) and size (Total Assets) are less than that of 
efficient CEOs; 
 In total, CEOs from 80 of the 221 companies included in the sample emerged as the benchmark CEOs and 
formed the efficiency frontier against which inefficient CEOs were compared; 
 On average, the Financials industry CEOs are only 57.7 per cent effective and their remuneration packages 
have to be reduced by at least 42.3 per cent; 
 CEOs of the Basic Materials and Oil & Gas industries have to increase company performance and size by 
almost four times in order to justify their current remuneration; 
 The lowest minimum reduction suggested by the DEA for Salary is 0.3 per cent, which means that all of the 
inefficient CEOs are overpaid to some extent in terms of their basic salary; 
 The DEA suggests minimum reductions of 0 per cent for Perquisites and Pension, Annual Bonus plans and 
Gains on Shares, which means that the current amounts paid in terms of these remuneration components to 
some inefficient CEOs are acceptable; 
 The DEA suggests a 100 per cent reduction in Gains on Shares earned by inefficient CEOs (with the 
exception of two cases within the Consumer Goods industry), meaning that the target amount of Gains on 
Shares for all inefficient companies is zero; 
 The DEA suggests that ROE has to be increased with as little as 0.5 per cent to a maximum of 135.4 per 
cent and Total Assets by a minimum of 1.9 per cent to a maximum of 2450.8 per cent in order to justify the 
current remuneration of inefficient CEOs. 
 
The conclusions that can be drawn from these results are that some CEOs are remunerated at an acceptable 
(best practice) level because they efficiently turn their remuneration into a number of company determinants, while 
other CEOs are inefficient because their current remuneration levels are not justified by the company’s current 
performance and size. The contribution of this study, despite its potential limitations, is that it is the first to use the 
DEA to analyze CEO remuneration of companies listed on the JSE and, instead of only using Total CEO 
Remuneration in the analysis, this study disaggregated total remuneration into Base Pay, Perquisites and Pension, 
Annual Bonus Plans and Long-term Incentives to provide more accurate benchmark information. Contrary to other 
South African studies on CEO remuneration, this study combined the determinants and components of CEO 
remuneration in a single model to establish benchmarks, based on best practices, and then suggested, from an input-
orientated view, reductions to the remuneration package structure, and from an output-orientated view, increases to 
the size and performance, for overpaid, underperforming CEOs. 
 
The first limitation of the study is that a number of companies had to be excluded from the initial sample, 
the second limitation is that there might still be considerable differences between companies within the same 
industry that are not reflected in the DEA results. Despite these limitations, this study provides an alternative way to 
analyze CEO remuneration and the multi-dimensionality of the DEA allows for many different research scenarios. 
Firstly, future studies can experiment by using different sets of inputs and outputs by including different 
remuneration or determinant variables with different measures for these variables. Secondly, the effect of time lags 
on remuneration can be investigated by using time series data in the DEA. Thirdly, the DEA can also be extended to 
analyze the remuneration of employees other than the CEO and finally, the DEA can be used with other statistical 
models to perform a more comprehensive analysis of CEO remuneration. 
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Appendix 1: Consumer Goods Results 
Consumer Goods 
Input-
Orientated 
Efficiency 
Reduction required Output-
Orientated 
Efficiency 
Increase required 
Salary 
Perquisites  
and Pension 
Annual  
Bonus Plans 
Gains on 
Shares ROE 
Total 
Assets 
Amalgamated Appliance Holdings   1.000 
    
1.000 
  Astral Foods 1.000 
    
1.000 
  British American Tobacco Plc    1.000 
    
1.000 
  Compagnie Financiere Richemont Sa 1.000 
    
1.000 
  Country Bird Holdings    1.000 
    
1.000 
  Crookes Brothers 1.000 
    
1.000 
  Distell Group    1.000 
    
1.000 
  Illovo Sugar 1.000 
    
1.000 
  Metair Investments   1.000 
    
1.000 
  Sabmiller Plc   1.000 
    
1.000 
  Steinhoff International Holdings 1.000 
    
1.000 
  Tiger Brands 1.000 
    
1.000 
  Tongaat Hulett   1.000 
    
1.000 
  Nu-World Holdings    0.976 -2.4% -39.3% 0% 0% 1.044 1.1% 178.3% 
Oceana Group 0.920 -8.0% -8.0% -8.0% 0% 1.121 1.3% 110.5% 
AFGRI    0.802 -19.8% -32.7% -19.8% 0% 1.353 6.7% 35.3% 
Pioneer Food Group   0.795 -20.5% -20.5% -20.5% -82.3% 1.660 8.5% 66.0% 
Rainbow Chicken  0.673 -32.7% -32.7% -32.7% 0% 1.701 9.4% 70.1% 
AVI  0.670 -33.0% -33.0% -33.0% -88.1% 2.002 16.1% 100.2% 
Sovereign Food Investments   0.628 -37.2% -37.2% -37.2% 0% 5.629 12.3% 462.9% 
 
